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Incorporation as a theory of constitutional interpretation is dying.
Incorporationist scholars are killing it. In this paper, I argue that they are
right to do so, whether they mean to or not. The current incorporation
debate bears so little resemblance to the theory of incorporation as it
originally emerged at the time of the New Deal that I argue it is time to
abandon the metaphor of incorporation altogether and admit that what
we are after has nothing to do with incorporated texts from 1787. Our
search is for the public understanding of texts added to the Constitution
* James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. My thanks to Steven D. Smith, Lawrence Solum and Michael Curtis for their
comments and suggestions.
in 1868. Because members of the Reconstruction Congress often linked
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights, at first
glance my proposal may seem to offer a distinction without a difference.
In fact, I believe a complete break from incorporation-talk is an important
step towards a more historically-contextual investigation of the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not only does it allow for a
more historically accurate account of Fourteenth Amendment-period
rights, it also opens the door to a more nuanced historical account that
gives due weight to federalism concerns which informed the original
understanding of the Amendment.
Incorporation began as a theory of judicial restraint, not a theory of
judicial interpretation. The idea of incorporated rights first appeared in
the decisions of the New Deal Court as part of its effort to explain its
role as a guardian of individual liberty, even as it abandoned its earlier
enforcement of liberty of contract. Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme
Court considered itself to have as free a hand in defining constitutional
liberty as it did in defining common law rights and obligations. Freedom of
speech and liberty of contract were protected not because they had
particular roots in the constitutional text, but because the Court considered
these to be fundamental rights as long recognized under common law.
At no time did the Pre-New Deal Court describe its efforts as
"incorporating" the texts of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, for some time, textual
inclusion in the Bill was one reason not to identify the right as a due
process liberty under the Fourteenth. Instead of "incorporation" of a
text, when the Pre-New Deal Court protected freedom of speech, or
liberty of contract, the Court described its effort as one of identifying
and enforcing rights deemed fundamental under the common law.
When the New Deal Court expanded its construction of federal
commercial regulatory power, this necessitated a new approach to
constitutional liberty. In cases like Carolene Products and West Va. v.
Barnette, the Court explained that the Lochner Court erred in its
enforcement of non-textual economic liberties like liberty of contract.
Henceforth, the Court would limit its heightened scrutiny of laws to those
cases involving a particular text that had been absorbed or incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment. This limitation to incorporated rights
ensured that the Court would not repeat the errors of Lochner and
engage in subjective identification and enforcement of what amounted to
the personal preferences of the justices.
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This newly constructed doctrine of incorporation was deeply criticized
by dissenting members of the Supreme Court at the time, and it faced
years of withering scholarly criticism as a doctrine that lacked both
historical and textual support. In the last few decades, however, the
doctrine has gained a high degree of scholarly respect as attention has
turned away from the Due Process Clause and towards the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as having the more legitimate claim as a fount of
incorporated rights. My own early work supported this new focus on the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.1
Ironically, the efforts of pro-incorporation scholars seem to have
undermined incorporation doctrine, at least as that theory was first proposed
and understood by the New Deal Court. The shift in focus away from
Due Process liberties to Privileges or Immunities has placed the judicial
enforcement of certain rights against state action on firmer textual and
historical ground. But the effort has also had the effect of highlighting
how public understanding of liberty evolved between the Founding and
Reconstruction. By now it should be clear that we are not incorporating
anything at all when we talk about rights under the original understanding
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. We are talking about the
public understanding of United States citizens' privileges or immunities
circa 1868. Even when the texts of the original Bill of Rights became
part of the debate, work by scholars like Michael Kent Curtis show that
public understanding of these rights had significantly changed in the
decades between the Founding and Reconstruction.
This shift in the public understanding of individual liberty suggests
that what we are after is not the incorporation of 1787 texts, but the
public understanding of 1868 texts-in particular the meaning of Privileges
or Immunities and the scope of congressional power to enforce these
newly constitutionalized rights. This may seem like a small and currently
well-accepted point. In fact, judicial doctrine and a great deal of
contemporary scholarship has yet to embrace the implications of shifting
ones' gaze away from 1787 and towards 1868. For example, where
incorporation scholarship often focuses on a single "incorporated" right,
the search for the meaning of privileges or immunities is a much broader
inquiry with implications that stretch far beyond a particular asserted
1. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise
of the Non-Establishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The
Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106 (1994).
right. The generation that adopted the Privileges or Immunities Clause
was well aware of these broader implications, and the potential scope of
the Clause became part of the debate which led to its framing and
adoption. Just as historical scholarship regarding the Founding has become
more sensitive to the interplay between Federalist and Anti-Federalist
arguments in shaping the likely public understanding of the original
Constitution, so Fourteenth Amendment historical scholarship must take
into account the interplay between nationalist and localist principles in
the debates which led to the drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The historical record that we have suggests that federalism
played a role in the original understanding of Section One and in the
assumed scope of congressional power under Section Five.
We are only at the beginning of a fully contextual investigation of the
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abandoning the
incorporation doctrine as a theory and a methodology will help accelerate
and facilitate the turn towards what is central question for originalists:
the original understanding of the Privileges or Immunities of citizens of
the United States.
I. THE BIRTH OF INCORPORATION DOCTRINE
Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence was based on a common law methodology by which the
Court identified and enforced certain liberties deemed fundamental
enough to qualify for heightened protection. The most prominent (and
infamous) of these rights were the common law economic rights protected
by the Supreme Court in cases like Allgeyer v. Louisiana2 and Lochner
v. New York. Although the Supreme Court during the same period also
found freedom of speech,4 the right to compensation for a taking of
property,5 and the right to counsel in capital cases6 to fall within the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, these protections had nothing
to do with the freedoms being listed in the original Bill of Rights.
Indeed, during the so-called Lochner era, being listed in the original Bill
was considered a good reason to not be included as a fundamental right
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since these rights were clearly not aspects of due process under the
original Bill of Rights, it seemed textually unlikely they were considered
aspects of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,
2. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
5. See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
6. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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in early substantive due process cases, a claimed right against the states
which was also listed in the original Bill had to overcome a textual
presumption that it was not an aspect of substantive due process.'
The rights most aggressively protected by the Lochner Court were
rights derived not from text, but from the common law. In addition to
liberty of contract, the Court enforced the parental right to control the
educational upbringing of children in and Meyer v. Nebraska8 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.9 It is important to note that the Court in
Meyer and Pierce said nothing about the Free Exercise Clause or even
the equal protection of religious and ethnic minorities. The Court in both
cases applied a purely Lochnerian common law analysis which placed
parental rights alongside the common law right to liberty of contract.' 0
In Meyer, for example, the Court explained its approach as invoking
"those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," and supported its decision
with citations to the Slaughterhouse Cases, A llgeyer, and Lochner.II
Even those cases which did invoke textual rights like freedom of
speech, the Supreme Court said nothing about "incorporation" or "absorption"
of rights listed in the original Bill. Instead, the Court merely expressed
its conclusion that these rights were fundamental liberties at common
law-a status that called for their heightened protection whether listed in
the original Bill or not. Indeed, the Court supported its "assumption"
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected freedom
of speech with a citation to, among other cases, Meyer v. Nebraska.12 As
the Supreme Court put it in Twining v. New Jersey, if a right listed in the
original Bill is to be protected against state action, "it is not because
those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because
7. For an example of the implied presumption against textual incorporation, See
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (noting that "explicit mention" in the Bill
of rights does not necessarily "argue exclusion elsewhere"). De Jonge was decided just
prior to the New Deal Revolution. See generally, Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention
of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
459, 483 n.110 (2001).
8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
10. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court stated the
right included liberty "to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience"
at 399.
11. Id.
12. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 n.9 (1925).
they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due
process of law."'
' 3
1I. TEXTUALISM AND THE NEW DEAL REVOLUTION
When the New Deal Court abandoned liberty of contract and the
Lochnerian approach to constitutional power, it justified its revisionist
jurisprudence as a return to text-based interpretation of the Constitution. 14
The first hint came in December of 1937 in Palko v. Connecticut,]
5
where the Court rejected a claim that liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment included all rights listed in the first eight amendments,
including the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. 16
Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo distinguished Lochnerian liberty
of contract from other aspects of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause such as freedom of speech, the press and the free exercise of
religion. He wrote, "[i]n these and other situations immunities that are
valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges
of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
become valid as against the states."' 7 Cardozo's link between Fourteenth
Amendment liberty and the "specific pledges of particular amendments"
necessarily excluded Lochnerian liberty of contract. It also excluded
non-textual liberties like the parental rights protected in Pierce. Rather
than place Pierce in the same dustbin as Lochner, however, Justice
Cardozo characterized Pierce as a free exercise case.' 8 This despite the
fact that the Court in Pierce never mentioned religious freedom and
based its decision instead on a parent's right to educate their child-a
theory broad enough to protect the rights of a military school. 19
The textualist link between Fourteenth Amendment liberty and the Bill
of Rights came up again only a few months later, this time appearing in a
footnote. In United States v. Carolene Products Company,'° the Court
declared that henceforth "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions" is to be presumed constitutional. 2' Justice
Stone then included a footnote which explained "[t]here may be narrower
13. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
14. This section is based on a more extensive investigation of the New Deal. See
Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937, supra note 7.
15. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
16. Id. at 323.
17. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
18. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324.
19. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
20. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
21. Id. at 152.
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scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 2 2 Stone thus
echoed Palko's focus on the "specific pledges of particular amendments.
23
By tying heightened protection of Fourteenth Amendment liberties to
rights expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the Court
distinguished Lochnerian speech, press and religious liberties from
Lochnerian liberty of contract and parental rights. As had Cardozo in
Palko, Stone linked the parental rights cases of Meyer and Pierce to
"specific prohibition[s]" in the Constitution by characterizing them as
involving the rights of religious (Pierce) and ethnic (Meyer) minorities.24
The Court's non-textualist approach to substantive due process triggered
vigorous dissents by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. According to
Justice Holmes, the Court was wrong to enforce rights like liberty of
contract which were "not specifically mentioned in the text of the
Constitution., 25  The New Deal Court now made Holmes's textualist
criticism the intellectual lodestone for the New Deal rejection of Lochner.
As Justice William 0. Douglas wrote for a unanimous Court in Olsen v.
Nebraska
26
In final analysis, the only constitutional prohibitions or restraints which
respondents have suggested for the invalidation of this legislation are those
notions of public policy embedded in earlier decisions of this Court but which,
as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the Constitution.
Since they do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot give them
continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the economic
and social programs of the states is to be determined.
27
22. Id. at 152 n.4.
23. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25.
24. According to Justice Stone in footnote 4:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, or national,
Meyer v. Nebraska, Bartels v. Iowa, Farrington v. Tokushige, or racial minorities,
Nixon v. Herndon, Nixon v. Condon; whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry. (internal citations omitted).
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
25. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525,568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26. 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (internal citations omitted).
27. Id. at 246-47.
The common law methodology which produced liberty of contract, the
story now went, allowed the Lochner Court to write its personal
predilections into the law.28 According to Felix Frankfurter, the words
"due process of law" and "equal protection of the laws,"
are so unrestrained, either by their intrinsic meaning, or by their history, or by
tradition, that they leave the individual Justice free, if, indeed, they do not
actually compel him, to fill in the vacuum with his own controlling conceptions,
which are bound to be determined by his experience, environment, imagination,
his hopes and fears-his "idealized political picture of the existing social
order."2 9
The problem with determining the "vague contours" of the Due Process
Clause would play a central role in the debate between Frankfurter and
Jackson regarding the New Deal charter of judicial review. Although he
would part ways with Frankfurter on the Doctrine of Incorporation,
Justice Jackson also believed that textual expression marked the
boundary between judicial deference to the political branches and
judicial enforcement of fundamental liberties. As he later wrote, "[m]uch
of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific
prohibitions of the First [Amendment] become its standard. '" 30
Linking heightened judicial protection to textual expression in the Bill
of Rights is a theme that appears throughout individual rights cases
during this period.3' Unlike cases prior to 1937, where textual expression
in the Bill of Rights was irrelevant to the common law approach to
defining "liberty," text now distinguished legitimate from illegitimate
interference with the political process. For the next several decades, the
issue became which texts were to be incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Failing to achieve majority
support for any particular approach to incorporation, the result by default
has been a "selective" approach whereby texts, one by one, are considered
as candidates for incorporation which most ultimately achieving the
honor. This case-by-case approach itself was an important aspect of the
New Deal Court's overriding principle of judicial restraint: the same
principle which led the Court to defer to the political process in both its
regulation of economic rights and commerce in general. It also prevented
any kind of wholesale incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights against
28. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633 (1936) (Stone,
J., dissenting).
29. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES'S CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS, IN
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTION 117 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970).
30. West Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
31. See sources cited in Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937, supra note
7, at 486 n.125.
454
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the states-a move that, in 1937, would have almost certainly resulted in
efforts to curtail the powers of the Supreme Court.
32
III. MODERN DUE PROCESS AND THE Two TRACK MODEL OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The modem Supreme Court, of course, has long since abandoned the
New Deal Court's textualist interpretation of substantive due process. In
cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court reconfigured
Pierce and Meyer once again, this time restoring their original Lochnerian
non-textual reading of Due Process and using this original non-textual
meaning as precedent in support of the non-textual right to privacy.
33
The restoration of non-textual substantive due process did not, however,
have any effect on the general incorporation debate. Instead, what developed
was a kind of two-track analysis: judicial enforcement of incorporated
(or claimed incorporated) rights focused heavily on the meaning of the
texts when first added to the constitution in 1791, while judicial
enforcement of non-textual substantive due process rights broke away
from any historical analysis whatsoever beyond an occasional nod to
developments at common law up to the modem era. Almost completely
missing from both tracks of analysis is a focus on the meaning of rights,
either textual or common law, at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
There are a number of problems with this two track analysis. First,
and most obviously, it creates a dual analysis for a single constitutional
text. Secondly, the incorporation track overemphasizes Founding-
era conceptions of rights and underestimates (or ignores) how the rights
represented by these texts were understood in 1868. A similar error
occurs on the second non-textual substantive incorporation track: although
generally sensitive to developments at common law since the time of
Reconstruction, little if any effort is made to identify legal principles at
play in 1868 which informed, and constrained, the understanding of
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
32. For a discussion of political efforts to reduce the independent powers of the
Supreme Court during this period, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 312-44 (1998).
33. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965). See also Lash, The
Constitutional Convention of 1937, supra note 7 at 496, n. 178.
IV. DISTINGUISHING 1791 RIGHTS FROM 1868 PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES: WATSON V. JONES
The work of Michael Kent Curtis has extensively documented how
freedom of speech developed in the period between the Founding and
Reconstruction.34 Of particular importance is how Professor Curtis's
work illustrates the growing perception of how politically inflammatory
speech deserved protection in face of southern demands that abolitionist
speech be suppressed. The debates regarding political and religiously
motivated speech are clearly relevant in determining the nature of
freedom of speech as a privilege or immunity of United States citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment. An incorporationist focus on free
speech circa 1787 will miss this critical development in expressive
rights. Similarly, public understanding of the nature of religious freedom
also developed in important ways in the years prior to the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Watson v. Jones
Immediately following the Civil War, the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church of the United States ("PCUS") adopted a resolution
that required new members who had previously advocated the divine
nature of slavery to "repent and forsake these sins" before being allowed
to join the church. 35 Enforcing this resolution tore apart the Walnut
Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky.36 Claiming that the
requirement violated the Presbyterian Constitution, a majority of the
local church trustees and a minority of the congregation seized control of
the Walnut Street Church and attempted to sever the Church's ties with
PCUS. The General Assembly promptly declared the local pro-Union
members to be the "true" Walnut Street Church and proceeded to
appoint new trustees. Both factions claimed control of the Church property
and the dispute landed in state court.37 The Kentucky Supreme Court
rejected the idea that the dispute involved a "question purely ecclesiastical,
34. In addition to his contribution to this symposium, Professor Curtis has
published a number of important works illustrating this development in the public
understanding of free speech. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); MICHAEL CURTIS, THE
PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2000).
35. For a discussion of the background to the Watson case, see Arlin M. Adams &
William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf. Church Autonomy and the Religious Clauses of the
First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER
AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 184-86 (1987).
36. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1867).
37. Id. at 343-44.
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to be settled by the synod itself and the general assembly, ' 38 and held
that the General Assembly had departed from its own laws when it
installed the new trustees. The losing pro-Union faction then sought
relief in federal court, and the case eventually made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
In Watson v. Jones,3 9 the Supreme Court declared that in the United
States "the right to organize voluntary religious associations ... and to
create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith ... is
unquestioned." 40 This right would be "totally subverted" if secular
courts were given the power to reverse the decisions of ecclesiastical
tribunals. 4' Therefore, "it is of the essence of these religious unions, and
of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising
among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of
ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism
itself provides for."4 2 This principle of national religious liberty could
not be reconciled with the "departure from doctrine" approach which
informed English common law:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice
any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does
not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe
personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed
to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.43
38. Id. at 348. According to the court:
Such a construction of the powers of church tribunals would, in our opinion,
subject all individual and property rights, confided or dedicated to the use of
religious organizations, to the arbitrary will of those who may constitute theirjudicatories and representative bodies, without regard to any of the regulations
or constitutional restraints by which, according to the principles and objects of
such organizations, it was intended that said individual and property rights
should be protected.
Id. This decision appears to conflict with prior cases decided by the Kentucky Supreme
Court. See id. at 376-78 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing both Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky.
(3 B. Mon.) 253 (1842), in which the court refused to apply the departure from doctrine
theory in a congregational church dispute, and Gibson v. Armstrong, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.)
481 (1847), in which the court indicated that, when in doubt, it should defer to the
church tribunals.).
39. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
40. Id. at 728-29.
41. Id. at 729.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 728.
Although Watson was decided on grounds of federal common law, the
rationale had broader implications. The Court in Watson refused to give
effect to the state court's determination that the elders who prevailed in
the Supreme Court were not elders at all. Justice Miller attempted to
gloss over this conflict with the Kentucky courts by holding that the
elders who prevailed in state court had since removed themselves from
the governance of the PCUS. Whether they had a right to remove
themselves along with the church property, of course, was the essence of
the dispute. In essence, the Supreme Court reversed a decision in the
same case by the state's highest court, and did so in order to vindicate
the people's "right to establish tribunals for the decision of religious
questions."
Watson is important for a number of reasons. To begin with, it contains
an extensive discussion of how the principle of non-establishment had
evolved in the period between the Founding and the Civil War. Although
departure from doctrine theory was generally acceptable at the time of
the Founding (a fact that by itself calls into questions a great many
separationist accounts of church-state relations in 1787), by Reconstruction
the same doctrine had been broadly rejected as a vestige of English
establishment jurisprudence. When the Court in Watson declared that the
"law knows no heresy," the "law" referred to was the common law in
most states. The Court treated this non-establishment principle as an
aspect of the right to free exercise of religion-a right also broadly
embraced at common law. By itself, the Court's discussion in Watson
was not dispositive of the issue; it required an historical investigation to
determine whether the Court had accurately captured the general status
of the law.4 But if the Court's analysis of the common law in Watson
was correct, then this is evidence that a non-establishment "privilege or
immunity" had emerged by 1868 which was not considered a right under
either state or federal law in 1787. An incorporationist account which
simply applied the original understanding of the Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses against the states would miss this development in
public understanding of non-establishment liberty.
Just to underline this point, consider what the Court in Watson did not
discuss: The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment. The Court said nothing about the textual referents to
religious freedom in the Bill of Rights. Instead, the Court discussed
principles which had emerged over time at common law. As I have
44. My own investigations suggest that states had, by and large, rejected departure
from doctrine theory by Reconstruction-and for the non-establishment reasons asserted
by the Watson Court. See Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause,
supra note 1.
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discussed elsewhere, these emergent common law principles were often
associated with the religious freedom texts of the First Amendment.4 5
Nevertheless, the principles themselves would not be discoverable
through an investigation of this text and its original meaning; they
existed as an aspect of what was publicly understood to be the
people's privileges or immunities at the time of Reconstruction.
Nothing was incorporated into Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in other words, other than the public meaning of that
particular text at the time of its ratification. This is not to say that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the texts of the Bill of
Rights as unimportant (indeed, to men like John Bingham, these texts
were extremely important). Those texts, however, were read in light of
1868 principles of individual liberty and the post-civil war
understanding of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Breaking away from the artificially narrow search for evidence of an
incorporated text allows for a more historically robust analysis of the
history surrounding the adoption of the privileges or immunities clause- a
search that may well have rather surprising results. For example, the
Supreme Court's decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases has been broadly
criticized for its emphasis on a federalist reading of the Constitution and
the presumption that texts should be read in a manner preserving state
autonomy in the absence of language expressly requiring otherwise.46 It
turns out, however, that some of the most influential figures in the
shaping of the Fourteenth Amendment assumed that the amended
Constitution would continue to embrace the presumptions of federalism
and the need to broadly preserve state autonomy.47
For example, incorporation advocates often invoke a speech by the
author of most of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, John
Bingham, in which Bingham describes an early version of Section One
45. See sources cited supra note 1.
46. See also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869) (Court narrowly construing
commerce power to avoid a dormant commerce clause claim against the state).
47. This is a point persuasively supported by the work of Bryan H. Wildenthal in
his article The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and
Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1051, 1114 (2000).
as making the Bill of Rights enforceable against the states. In his speech,
however, Bingham stressed a limited reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in order to avoid unduly intruding upon matters which ought to
remain under the control of the people in the states:
[Bingham] repelled the suggestion, made in the heat of debate, that the committee,
or any of its members, sought, in any form, to mar the Constitution, or to take
from any State rights that belonged to it under the Constitution. This was simply
a proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the consent of the
people with power to enforce the Bill of Rights, as it stood today in the
Constitution. It had that extent. No more.
48
Although in prior work I had echoed the common assumption that
Bingham read the Privileges or Immunities Clause to have nationalized
more rights that those listed in the first eight amendments, I am no
longer convinced this is the case. Certainly, statements like the above
suggest that key players in the drama which produced the Fourteenth
Amendment viewed the effort as preserving critical aspects of state
autonomy even as it established new national rights.
49
Even the most radical of Republicans conceded that the principles
underlying the Tenth Amendment continued to operate in the aftermath
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. For example, Ohio
Republican and close associate of John Bingham, Samuel Shellabarger
rejected claims that the proposed Fifteenth Amendment would in any
way alter the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
According to Shellabarger:
The Constitution itself in express terms provides that:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people.
Hence it follows that the power of regulating elections not being prohibited
to the States by the Constitution as it stands, resides now either with the
states or with the people. If this is so, if the power to regulate elections of
registrations resides with the States under the Constitution in its present
form, then my proposition will not take it away. It simply provides that the
right to vote shall be exercised by all male citizens of a certain age. Every
48. THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER; March 1, 1866, at 1.
49. See Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1866-67, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1509, 1617
(2007) ( (demonstrating Bingham's agreement with Justice Black that the Bill of Rights
was both "a ceiling and a floor" in terms of the original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.). In a forthcoming series of papers, I will explore the original
understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and its likely limitation to rights
listed in the text of the original Constitution. See Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I & 11 (forthcoming).
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power now residing with the States, under the Constitution, except so far as
this amendment takes away their power, will remain with them still." 50
Notice that Shellabarger not only insisted that the Tenth and its original
principles remained in operation, he also continued to read "or to the
people" as referring to the people in the several states. His comments
regarding the Tenth are not unusual; references to the restrictive principles
of the Tenth Amendment can be found throughout the Reconstruction
debates. Following a practice since the time of the Founding, members
of the Reconstruction Congress cited both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as dual guarantors of state sovereignty-and did so in a
manner indicating that these principles remained in operation despite the
adoption of new and significant constraints upon the states. As
Bingham's comments illustrate, the principles of federalism represented
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments also informed a (limited) construction
of Section One. In fact, there is good reason to believe these same principles
informed a limited reading of congressional power under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
VI. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND RECONSTRUCTION
One of the earliest and clearest examples of how federalism called for
a limited construction of federal power occurred in the pre- and post
ratification debates regarding Article III and state suability. Critics of
the proposed Article III claimed that the clause would be interpreted to
the fullest extent possible thus allowing individuals to sue non-consenting
50. Remarks of Representative Samuel Shellabarger Jan. 29, 1869, CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d sess. 727 (1869). John Harrison describes Shellabarger as "a leading
Republican legal theorist in the House." See John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity
and Congress's Enforcement Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 353, 366 (2007). For a
description of Shellabarger as a "principal radical theoretician," see WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 164 (1972). Shellabarger,
of course, rejected the idea that the Reconstruction Amendments should be strictly
construed. See Letter from Shellabarger to J. Comly (Apr. 10, 1871), Comly MSS, Ohio
Historical Society. The relevant portions of this letter are quoted in HAROLD M. HYMAN
& WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
1835-1875, at 471 (1982).
51. See Remarks of William T. Hamilton May 18, 1870 (D. MD), CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. S.P. App. 354 (quoting Ninth and Tenth Amendments in support of
narrow reading of the federal power to enforce voting rights).
states in federal court.52 Federalist defenders of the Constitution responded
by insisting that states were presumptively immune from such suits and
would continue to so under the proposed Constitution.53 Because the
text of Article III did not require such a broad reading of federal judicial
power, it was construed in a manner that excluded private suits against
the states, thus preserving the retained sovereignty of the states. It was
the failure of Federalist judges to apply this rule in the first years of the
Constitution that led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment-an
amendment which merely codified what had been understood as the
proper construction of Article III.
The issue of suing states and state officials emerged once again in the
debates surrounding the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments
and the attempts of Congress to enact legislation holding state officials
accountable for violating the rights of newly freed Blacks in the South.
5 4
Judicial opinions and legal commentary in the years leading up to the
Civil War continued to follow the rule of presumed state sovereign
immunity. According to Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the
Constitution, "It is a known maxim, justified by the general sense and
practice of mankind, and recognized in the law of nations, that it is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
any private person, without its own consent. This exemption is an
attribute of sovereignty, belonging to every state in the Union. ' 5  Case
law right up to the civil war followed the same rule.56 As the Supreme
Court of Georgia succinctly stated, "The State cannot be sued.
57
In the Reconstruction Congress, the debates reflected a widespread
assumption that state governments could not be sued without their
consent. This was true both during the debates over the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and after those amendments had
been ratified. No member of the various Congresses which produced the
Reconstruction Amendments suggested that by doing so, Congress now
had authority to authorize suits by individuals against the states. Instead,
52. See generally, Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh
Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1577 (2009).
53. Id. at 1599-1604 (quoting James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King,
John Marshall, and others).
54. For a general discussion of the issues and evidence cited in this section, see
John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress's Enforcement Powers, 2006
SuP. CT. REv. 353 (2006).
55. JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
538, Section 1669 (1833) (footnotes omitted).
56. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187, 189 (1851) ("it is the prerogative
of the sovereign to be exempt from coercion by action").
57. Walker v. Spullock, 23 Ga. 436,438 (1857).
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the various debates indicate a widespread belief that although individual
state officials might be held accountable, states as such could not be
sued without their consent. Republican Senator John Pool of North
Carolina, for example, explained (without contradiction) that Congress's
powers under Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment allowed for
legislation holding individual state officials accountable, but not states
themselves; states could not be punished for a crime.5 8 Other Republicans
refused to go even that far, arguing that criminal liability for state
officials would destroy local self-government. 59 Senator Oliver Morton
of Indiana supported the 1871 Ku Klux Klan act which authorized suits
against state and private individuals in part because states themselves
could not be indicted or punished as states.60  According to Morton,
"[t]here can be no legislation to enforce [Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment] as against a state. 6 1 John Bingham, the author of Section
One, agreed: "the United States punishes men, not states, for a violation
of its law."62
Interestingly, these debates did not involve suits by out of state
residents-a subject expressly covered by the Eleventh Amendment-
but rather suits by state residents aggrieved by their own state officials.
By assuming states themselves could not be sued, the Republican
members of the Reconstruction Congresses implicitly assumed the need
to construe federal judicial power in a manner preserving the sovereign
status of the states. They assumed, in other words, a pre-existing and on-
going principle of strict construction of Article 111.63 This does not mean
that the Reconstruction Amendments did not accomplish a dramatic
realignment of federal-state authority (perhaps more than the courts
recognized at the time). It does mean, however, that whatever the
understood scope of these Amendments, there is no evidence that their
58. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611 (1870).
59. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. App. 421-22 (Remarks of Senator Joseph
Fowler, Republican, Tenn.) (1870).
60. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 251 (1871) (remarks of Senator
Morton) ("There can be no legislation to enforce [Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment] as against a state. A criminal law cannot be made against a state. A State
cannot be indicted or punished as such. The legislation which Congress is authorized to
enact must operate, if at all, on individuals.").
61. Id.
62. Id. at App. 86.
63. For a general discussion of the original strict construction of Article III and its
relationship to the principles of narrow construction announced by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, see Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 52, at 1609.
framers or ratifiers understood them as having erased the status of the
states as independent sovereignties nor the need to take this status into
account when construing delegated power and rights.64
In sum, it appears that the Reconstruction Congress assumed the continued,
if trimmed, operation of the Tenth Amendment and the continued existence
of the state as independent sovereign entities. If the Republican members
of the Reconstruction Congress shared this view of the retained sovereignty
of the states, then we can be sure the Democratic members did as
well. The same would be true of those who ratified the Reconstruction
Amendments, for they did so against a backdrop of judicial opinions and
legal commentary that assumed the continued remnant sovereignty of
the states. Not even the most radical of the congressional Republicans
claimed that the new Amendments would alter this fundamental aspect
of the federal Constitution.
VII. THE RECONSTRUCTION SUPREME COURT AND FEDERALIST
CONSTRUCTION OF DELEGATED FEDERAL POWER
The same year the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the United
States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the
federalist based rule of strict construction. In Lane County v. Oregon,
65
Lincoln-appointee, Republican Salmon P. Chase, led a unanimous Court
in upholding Oregon's right to require the payment of debts in gold or
silver coin instead of federal notes (as required by federal law). Chase
supported his ruling by recounting the "separate and independent
existence" of the states in the federal system. 66 "To them nearly the
whole charge of interior regulation is committed or left; to them and to
the people all powers not expressly delegated to the national government
are reserved. The general condition was well stated by Mr. Madison in
the Federalist, thus: 'The Federal and State governments are in fact but
different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different
powers and designated for different purposes." 67 As Chief Justice Chase
would write later that same term, "[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."68
64. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress could authorize individual suits against the states by way of its enforcement
powers under section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fitzpatrick Court did not
engage in any historical analysis, nor have later cases which continue to follow Fitzpatrick.
See Harrison, supra note 50, at 354.
65. 74 U.S. 71 (1868).
66. Id. at 76.
67. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
68. Id.
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As a Lincoln Republican, Chase rejected the power of the states to
secede from the Union.69 But rejecting this claim of sovereignty did not
lead the Reconstruction Supreme Court to reject the idea of remnant
sovereignty and the continued independent existence of the states. In its
earliest decisions following the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Supreme Court continued to follow Madison's rule of
''expressly delegated power" and its attendant requirement that federal
power be narrowly construed. For example, in the 1870 case Collector
v. Day, the Supreme Court narrowly construed Congress's delegated powers
of taxation and struck down an attempt to tax the salary of state
officials. 70 According to Justice Samuel Nelson, the adoption of the
Tenth Amendment established a rule of interpretation whereby, "[t]he
government of the United States [] can claim no powers which are not
granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must
be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.,
71
This is, of course, precisely what James Madison, John Page, St. George
Tucker, and others in the Founding generation, identified as the federal
rule of strict construction under which all federal power would be
narrowly construed to preserve the retained sovereignty of the states.72
As the Court in Day concluded, the appointment of officers to administer
their laws was, "one of the sovereign powers vested in the States by their
constitutions, which remained unaltered and unimpaired, and in respect
to which the State [wa]s as independent of the general government as
that government [wa]s independent of the States"-an independence
which included independence from federal taxation. 73 Although Justice
Bradley dissented, Nelson's opinion was joined by the rest of the Court,
including Chief Justice Chase. Nelson's opinion in Collector v. Day would
remain the rule until the time of the New Deal.74
Obviously, much more work needs to be done regarding the originally
understood scope of congressional power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The point here is merely to illustrate that
69. Id.
70. 78 U.S. 113 (1870) (Nelson, J.)
71. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 124 (1870) (Nelson, J.).
72. See Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Popular Sovereignty and "Expressly" Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889
(2008).
73. 78 U.S. at 126.
74. See Helvering v. Gerhardt 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Graves v. O'Keefe 306 U.S.
466 (1939) (overruling Day).
the principles of federalism appear to have survived the adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments and that these cross currents of assumed
state autonomy (and immunity) must be taken into account in determining
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of this
is captured in a discussion dominated by "incorporation of the Bill of
Rights."
VIII. CONCLUSION
Incorporation doctrine emerged as part of an effort to explain the New
Deal Court's roll back of substantive due process rights. The fact that
the Supreme Court no longer follows the New Deal Court's distinction
between textual and non-textual substantive due process rights is only
more reason to make a clean break from a doctrine that misleadingly
implies that we are taking provisions from the Bill of Rights and
incorporating them into the Fourteenth. The generation that added the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution had their own understanding
of national liberty, one that diverged in important ways from the
conception of liberty which held sway at the Founding. Although this
understanding in some ways will be more libertarian than the Founding-
era conception (see the Court's embrace of non-establishment principles
in Watson), in other ways federalism appears to have continued to
inform and constrain the interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment rights
and powers. Both aspects-transformed rights and the cross currents of
federalism-are missed by the model and methodology of incorporation
doctrine.
It is the work of incorporationists themselves which points to a future
beyond incorporation. The efforts to support substantively libertarian
readings of Section One shifted attention away from the Due Process
Clause (an odd choice to begin with) and towards the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. This move held the promise of an incorporation
doctrine grounded in both text and the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment-neither of which seemed possible under the
older Due Process incorporation approach. But the same historical effort
which seemed to support incorporation doctrine carried with it the seeds
of that doctrine's destruction. We have not discovered a generation who
applied the ideals of Madison and Jefferson against the states. Instead,
the record reveals a generation with its own ideas of liberty and local
autonomy, and if the inquiry is to discover the original understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment, then it is their understanding that controls.
This suggests that future historical investigation of the Fourteenth
Amendment will be something of a double-edged sword. As was true at
the time of the Founding, when the people adopted the Fourteenth
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Amendment, federal authority grew while state authority receded. But
as was also true at the Founding, newly delegated federal authority
remained constrained by the continuing principle of federalism, a
principle which called for a limited construction of nationalized rights
and powers.
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